S ince 1989, experts have argued that Internet security requires cryptographic protocols to ensure security against man-in-the-middle (MITM) a ackers. 1 An MITM a acker is located on the path between parties and can intercept, modify, and block their communication and inject spoofed packets (see the MITM a acker in Figure 1 ).
To provide security against MITM a ackers, the information security community invested signi cant e ort in developing cryptographic protocols, standards, and products, such as IPsec, SSL/TLS, Secure BGP, and DNSSEC (RFCs 4033-4035). Despite these e orts and although Internet security is recognized as critical, most Internet tra c isn't cryptographically protected. For example, we found that only about 6 percent of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) tra c is cryptographically protected with SSL/TLS (based on a CAIDA dataset of 3 million packets), 2 and less than 1 percent of Domain Name System (DNS) resolvers enforce DNSSEC validation. 3 We believe that the main reason for the underutilization of cryptography is an illusion of security against network-based a acks that stems from two false beliefs. e rst is that a ackers can rarely obtain MITM capabilities, and even when they can, they're reluctant to do so because such activities might lead to detection. We claim that this is incorrect; there are common scenarios in which a ackers obtain MITM capabilities, for instance, by accessing wireless communication, manipulating the largely unprotected routing mechanisms, or controlling an intermediate device. A ackers o en carry out such a acks without detection and repercussions for instance, route hijacking occurs frequently. 4 However, we focus here on the second belief that noncryptographic protocols provide su cient protection against typical a ackers and, in particular, o -path a ackers. Unlike MITM a ackers, o -path a ackers can't observe or modify legitimate packets sent between other parties; however, they can transmit packets with a spoofed source IP address impersonating a legitimate party, as O -Path Oscar illustrates in Figure 1 . A ackers use spoofed packets, most notably in denial-of-service a acks. e network operations community has developed methods to make spoo ng less readily available to a ackers, such as ingress ltering (RFC 3704), but IP spoo ng is still possible via many ISPs. 5 In this article, we assert that this second belief is false and that current Internet protocols are o en vulnerable to o -path a ackers. Speci cally, we discuss two recent methods that allow o -path a acks on basic Internet protocols: tra c injection into TCP connections and DNS cache poisoning. Background e o -path a acks we discuss rely on the circumvention of challenge-response defenses, which distinguish
O -Path Hacking:
e Illusion of Challenge-Response Authentication between spoofed packets from off-path attackers and legitimate packets from the communication endpoints. To authenticate a server response, a client sends a random challenge with the request, which is echoed in the response. Because the off-path attacker, who we dubbed Oscar, can't eavesdrop on packets exchanged between the server and the client, Oscar might have to guess the challenge. Therefore, a sufficiently long, random challenge prevents Oscar from crafting a packet with a valid response.
The security of most Internet applications-for example, email, Web surfing, and most peer-to-peer applications-relies on challenge-response mechanisms, mainly as part of the underlying TCP and DNS protocols. For instance, widely used Web security based on cookies and other "same origin policy" (SOP; RFC 6454) mechanisms depends on both TCP and DNS security.
Vulnerabilities
Trivially, challenge-response mechanisms are ineffective against MITM attackers, who can eavesdrop on challenges and send matching responses. The false sense of security is due to the first belief we mentioned-that MITM capabilities are rarely practical. The second belief is supported by standards such as RFC 4953 and RFC 5452, which state that TCP and DNS specifications and implementations provide security against off-path adversaries. Indeed, since the Internet's early days, most traffic has been directed using DNS and carried over TCP-where both are protected using only challenge-response mechanisms. This is in spite of many warnings. 1, 6, 7 Most existing challenge-response mechanisms are "patches" that reuse existing fields in the protocol as challenges; as we show later, this is often the root of the vulnerability. DNS uses a random 16-bit transaction identifier (TXID) field that associates a DNS response with its corresponding request; however, the TXID is too short to provide sufficient defense. TCP's main defense is the random 32-bit initial sequence number (ISN; RFC 6528) that identifies where the payload bytes fit in the transmission stream. Furthermore, many TCP and DNS implementations also use a random 16-bit source port, which identifies the client-side application in requests, echoed as a destination port in responses (RFC 6056).
Many attackers exploit the fact that challenge fields had a different original purpose in the protocol and learn the correct response in a separate attack phase; this strategy lets attackers provide a valid response to all challenges in a reasonable amount of time.
Several vulnerabilities contribute to off-path attacks on TCP and DNS in common scenarios, allowing circumvention of challenge-response mechanisms: ■ Insufficient entropy. Challenges might be too short or nonuniform; adversaries used both vulnerabilities in attacks against old DNS 8, 9 and TCP 10, 11 implementations. ■ Piggybacking. Attackers "piggyback" fake content onto valid responses containing correct challenges, exploiting IP fragmentation. Adversaries used such attacks on DNS 12 and TCP. 13,14 ■ Side channels. Attackers reduce the challenge's entropy by exploiting the fact that challenges mostly or wholly reuse existing protocol fields. Challenges are fields that already exist in requests and are echoed in responses for other purposes. Such attacks occurred in DNS [15] [16] [17] and TCP. 7, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] Again, many of these vulnerabilities are caused by an attempt to retrofit security by incorporating a challenge-response mechanism into an existing protocol. By reusing existing protocol fields, this defense changes only the clients, without coordinated changes to servers and the protocol. Such defenses are much easier to deploy but are easier to attack.
Good defenses require changes to the protocols; these might be harder to deploy but are vital for security. The changes can use explicit and dedicated challengeresponse mechanisms 24 or cryptographic defenses, such as signatures and message authentication codes. Senders compute cryptographic defenses using their private signing key or a secret shared authentication key, and recipients validate authenticity with the corresponding key. In contrast to challenge-response defenses, cryptography requires additional infrastructures, for example, a public-key infrastructure, as well as additional computations and communication. However, cryptography can protect against MITM attackers and is usually affordable-even relatively limited clients, such as Because security against off-path or MITM attackers wasn't the protocols' original design goal, the specifications underwent only minimal changes to support challenge-response defenses, for example, selecting identifiers at random. Indeed, over the years, security practitioners and researchers dedicated significant attention and effort to validate and improve TCP and DNS off-path security. Adversaries launched numerous off-path attacks, some of them widely publicized. Figure 2 shows a timeline of important TCP and DNS attacks.
The timeline begins with the 1985 publication of a TCP injection attack using predictable sequence numbers 7 and Steven Bellovin's seminal paper from 1989 in which he stated that security shouldn't be based on the presumed off-path protection of DNS and TCP. 1 Bellovin presented TCP implementation vulnerabilities to off-path attacks and discussed potential exploits and defenses.
Unfortunately, despite these warnings, most TCP stacks still used trivially predictable ISNs until 1995. This changed only after Kevin Mitnick's notorious TCP injection attack on Tsutomi Shimomura. 18 After the attack, many implementations changed to "less predictable" ISN choices. However, in 2001, Michal Zalewski showed that most implementations were still sufficiently predictable, allowing off-path attacks. 11 This motivated more random ISNs in most operating systems, as standardized in RFC 6528. In 2003, Zalewski also commented that piggybacking on fragmented TCP traffic might allow injection attacks 13 ; the piggybacking attack improved 14 and was exploited for DNS poisoning. 12 In 2004, Paul Watson presented a special TCP injection attack that injected only a reset packet, breaking up a connection. 10 It focused on long-lived connections using known client and server ports and addresses, which the Internet routing protocol Border Gateway Protocol used at the time. To address this concern, many TCP implementations also began using "unpredictable" client ports.
In 2007, two surprises occurred: pseudonymous author klm presented a TCP injection attack in Phrack magazine, 19 and a DNS poisoning attack exploited poor random number generators. 8 Both attacks were clever and significant, although limited in scope. In particular, the TCP attack worked only against Windows machines connected directly to the Internet (rather than via firewall, as usually is the case) and didn't handle concurrent connections.
In 2008, Dan Kaminsky presented an even more significant DNS poisoning attack that allowed efficient off-path poisoning of most DNS resolver implementations at the time. 9 The response to this attack was rapid adoption of additional patches (mostly more challengeresponse fields), increasing the random challenge's length and, ideally, making the attack impractical. The most notable patch was source port randomization (SPR; RFC 5452).
Several years passed without additional off-path attacks; SPR and other patches to DNS resolvers addressed Kaminsky's attack, and klm's attack was impractical and not widely known. This changed dramatically between 2011 and 2013 with the publication of 10 new off-path attacks. The first was an attack on fragmented IP traffic, 14 followed by four new DNS poisoning attacks, 12,15-17 a connection-exposing attack, 25 and four TCP injection attacks. [20] [21] [22] 
Malicious Agents
In addition to spoofing ability, some off-path attacks require a malicious agent in the victim's network or host. We briefly explain the different agent models.
A zombie is an adversary-controlled machine, for example, compromised by malware, in the victim's network. A puppet is a weaker agent-a restricted malicious script or applet running in a Web browser sandbox. Attacks relying on a puppet agent require only that a client in the victim network navigates to the attacker's website, enabling the adversary to run such a script. The script is restricted by SOP; it can communicate only via the browser-that is, it can request and receive HTTP objects but can't access TCP/IP packet headers.
DNS Cache Poisoning
DNS provides Internet services with name-to-address mapping. DNS name servers maintain the mappings for their domains' services, and clients use DNS resolver agents to retrieve the mappings from the name servers.
Resolvers send requests to name servers and receive responses, which are validated before acceptance and caching; widely deployed validations rely on challengeresponse mechanisms. The resolvers send the challenges-for example, in the form of a random 16-bit TXID field in the request-and validate that the same values appear in responses. As we show here, these challenge-response defenses can fail even against weak, offpath attackers.
Kaminsky's DNS Cache Poisoning
In 2008, Kaminsky presented an efficient cache-poisoning attack against resolvers that authenticated responses using a random TXID and a known, fixed source port, which at that time, was 53. 9 Following are the attack's steps, illustrated in Figure 3 :
1. The attacker triggers a DNS request for $1.foo. com, a random subdomain of the victim domain. 2. The DNS resolver receives the request and forwards it to the target name server. 3. The attacker sends 2 16 responses with a spoofed source IP of the name server; each response is a referral mapping of the name server ns.foo.com to 6.6.6.6, an IP address the attacker controls. 4. The response containing the correct TXID is accepted, cached, and returned to the client. 5. The authentic DNS response is ignored because no matching pending request exists.
If the attack fails-that is, an authentic response from the real name server arrives before the correct response from the attacker-it's repeated with a new random subdomain, $2.foo.com. Again, following Kaminsky's attack, security practitioners and researchers proposed additional challengeresponse mechanisms to increase the DNS requests' entropy. The most popular mechanism, supported by most resolvers, is source port randomization, which in tandem with TXID, produces a search space of 2 32 values and was believed to provide sufficient protection against poisoning by off-path adversaries. This reduced the motivation to deploy DNSSEC, the cryptographic defense against poisoning.
In previous work, we presented different techniques that allow circumvention of popular defenses against poisoning by off-path attackers. 12, [15] [16] [17] In this article, we show a simple technique that uses side channels for port prediction and applies to common network scenarios in which DNS resolvers are located behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) device (see Figure 1 ). 15
Vulnerability of Resolvers behind NAT
NAT devices alleviate the problem of IPv4 address depletion by allocating nonunique addresses in local networks and sharing unique external addresses among several internal hosts. They modify outbound packets' source ports to correlate inbound packets and internal hosts.
NAT devices were patched to support port randomization to prevent attacks. However, even systems that randomize ports in outbound packets might expose resolvers to attacks. We tested NAT devices that support unpredictable port allocation algorithms and are reported as secure by DNS checkers, yet are vulnerable to port derandomization. 15 Our attacks exploit standard-and correct-device behavior, for example, a per-destination ports allocation (recommended in RFC 6056). Side channels, which algorithm designers might not have considered, enable our attacks. We describe port derandomization on per-destination ports allocation, implemented by many systems (see the "Security of Patched DNS" sidebar for other popular algorithms 15 ).
Per-destination ports allocation. For a tuple defined by <src-IP:src-port,dst-IP:dst-port,protocol>, a perdestination NAT selects the first port at random; subsequent ports increase sequentially for that tuple.
Predict-then-poison attack. Oscar controls a zombie that runs on a client host in the LAN. The attack has two phases: port prediction and poisoning (see Figure 4 ). During the port prediction phase, Oscar and the zombie expose the port that will be allocated to the DNS resolver's request. This phase, which bypasses the SPR defense, works as follows:
1. The zombie sends a packet to create a mapping in the NAT table; in the example in Figure 4 , port 6666 was selected. 2. At IP address 6.6.6.6, Oscar sends 2 16 packets with a spoofed source IP of 8.8.8.8, such that each is sent to a different NAT port and contains the destination port in its payload. Only the packet to port 6666 arrives at the zombie. 3. The zombie increments this port by 1-in our example, the result is 6667-and sends it to Oscar; NAT allocates this external port to the resolver's
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subsequent DNS request for a record in the victim's domain.
Next, during the poisoning phase, Kaminsky's attack is launched.
Empirical Evaluation
We validated the recent DNS poisoning results empirically in many different network settings and for a large variety of devices. 12, [15] [16] [17] Here, we focus on the attacks in "Security of Patched DNS," including the predict-thenpoison attack 15 ; the viability of these attacks (and others) depends mainly on the NAT's port allocation method. We tested the attacks on eight popular NAT devices. Of these, two used sequential port allocation (Linux Netfilter and Windows ICS) and hence were vulnerable to the predict-then-poison attack. Five NAT devices (Fedora, Wingate, FreeBSD, Cisco IOS, and Cisco 16 responses with a spoofed source IP of the name server; each response is a referral mapping of the name server ns.foo.com to 6.6.6.6, an IP address the attacker controls. (4) The response containing the correct transaction identifier (TXID) is accepted, cached, and returned to the client. (5) The authentic DNS response is ignored because no matching pending request exists. ASA) were vulnerable to the trap attacks, and only one (Checkpoint FW-1) was immune to the attacks. We performed all tests using a Bind9 DNS resolver connected to the attacker via the different NAT devices. Using traces from two CAIDA datasets from 2012, 2 we checked port allocation methods in DNS requests sent to the attacker over UDP and found that 30 percent of the requests were sent from a fixed port and 54 percent were sent from incrementing ports.
TCP Injections
TCP is the Internet's main transport protocol, carrying most of the communication between clients and servers. The recent off-path TCP injection attacks operate in two phases:
■ Learn connection four-tuple. Oscar learns the four parameters of a client and server's TCP connectionthat is, their respective IP addresses and ports. ■ Learn sequence number. Oscar learns the current sequence number for packets sent from the server to the client or vice versa.
After Oscar learns the connection four-tuple and one of the sequence numbers, he can inject data into the TCP connection, impersonating one of the participating peers when communicating with the other. Table 1 shows the techniques the recent injection attacks used for both phases as well as their requirements.
Learn Connection Four-Tuple
To launch an injection attack, Oscar must first identify a TCP connection between the victim client and server. Identifying this connection sometimes requires 
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scanning the victim's machine, either remotely 19 or locally 22, 23 ; see Table 1 .
We describe a simple method using a puppet running on the client machine to open such a connection. Because Oscar opens the connection, he chooses the server and thus knows its IP address and port. To find the client's IP address, the puppet sends a request to Oscar's site; this request contains the client's IP address.
Detecting the client port is this phase's final challenge. In "When Tolerance Becomes Weakness: The Case of Injection-Friendly Browsers," we showed how to break the randomized port selection algorithm, which was standardized in RFC 6056 and used by Linux and Android clients. 21 This attack exploits the TCP state machine, which leaks information about the client port choice to Oscar.
However, in many cases, the attack is simpler because clients-in particular, those running Windows-don't use a randomized algorithm and assign ports to connections sequentially. We exploited this port selection method as follows: The puppet opens a connection to Oscar's remote site before and after opening the connection to the victim server. Oscar observes p 1 and p 2 , the client ports used in the connection to his sites. If p 2 = p 1 + 2, he learns that the connection to the server is via port p 1 + 1 20 ; if not, Oscar restarts the attack.
Learn Sequence Number
The next step is learning one or both of the connection sequence numbers. Off-path attackers use different methods to infer sequence numbers because they can't observe them directly. We focus on a technique that exploits an underspecification of HTTP. 21 Background. As of HTTP 1.1, clients can send multiple requests to the same webserver in a pipeline over a single "persistent" HTTP connection. To allow browsers to match each response with the corresponding request, the server sends the responses in the order in which it receives requests. Browsers keep a first-in, first-out queue of pending HTTP requests for each connection and handle them one by one, reading the bytes in the TCP connection's receive buffer when they become available. They expect to find the matching response in the beginning of the TCP's receive buffer and parse the response.
The HTTP standard doesn't specify what browsers should do when the receive buffer contains data that's not a valid, parsable HTTP response. Browsers often handle this situation by treating all available data in the receive buffer as payload of a response with the following default HTTP header: Browsers return this "response" to the requesting module-normally, the rendering engine.
Sequence number learning technique. The learning phase has two steps: inject and observe, as Figure 5 illustrates.
In the inject step, Oscar injects data into the stream of HTTP responses that the server sends to the client. wnd denotes the browser's receive buffer for the connection, and |wnd| denotes its size. To inject the data, Oscar sends the browser 2 32 /|wnd| packets, spoofed to appear to be from the server (on its victim connection with the client). The ith packet has server sequence number i · |wnd|. Because the sequence number field is 32 bits long, exactly one of these packets has a valid sequence number that falls in the limits of wnd; the client discards all other packets. Each of Oscar's packets contains page(i) as payload-a simple webpage defined as follows: <HTML><BODY> <iframe src = "oscar.com/i.html" /> </BODY></HTML>. The puppet makes requests to the server until it reaches the data Oscar injected in the previous step. Each server response that arrives at the client shifts wnd forward; after enough such responses arrive, there's no gap of unreceived bytes between the injected data and the beginning of wnd. Then, the browser reads the injected response, assuming that it corresponds to the request.
The last server response usually overwrites the beginning of the injected data (according to the TCP specification, in case of overlap, new data supersedes the old); therefore, the injected response will usually be corrupt. However, as we noted, many browsers handle the injected data as payload wrapped with a default header. When the browser renders page(i), it tries to retrieve i.html from Oscar's website, providing Oscar the value of i (see Figure 5 ). When Oscar sends page(i) in the inject step, he prepends to it an easily removable pad to keep page(i) intact despite the overwrite. The value of i allows Oscar to compute the next server sequence number that the client expects.
Empirical Evaluation
We evaluated the inject and observe technique on connections with Alexa's 1,000 most popular websites. We placed the attacker and client machines in the same network, which allowed the attacker to send packets to the Internet using the client's IP address. (In reality, the attacker would connect through one of the many ISPs that don't perform ingress filtering.) The client and attacker connected through different physical interfaces of a network switch; hence, the attacker was off path and couldn't observe packets to and from the client. The client and attacker connected to the Internet through a 10 Mbps link.
To identify a successful exposure of the sequence numbers, we used the puppet to request a nonexistent object from the server and injected a spoofed HTTP OK response. If the puppet identified the spoofed OK response, the data injection was successful, and the attacker obtained the correct sequence numbers.
We performed three executions of the attack using Chrome version 23, Firefox version 16, and Internet 
Exploiting Injection and Poisoning
Exploiting DNS poisoning is straightforward. Both users and applications use DNS extensively to resolve domain names. DNS poisoning allows circumvention of security mechanisms, such as a Sender Policy Framework and blacklists, as well as hijacking of connection requests to legitimate servers. Hijacking can allow phishing, which can lead to exposed credentials and installed malware. The poisoned mapping is cached and hence can impact many users of the resolver. Exploiting TCP injections is more challenging because TCP doesn't involve caching. However, in common scenarios, TCP injections can allow critical exploits. In particular, they suffice to circumvent the SOP, hijack cookies, and cause malicious script (XSS) execution. To cause long-term impact similar to DNS poisoning, attackers can exploit Web caching. By crafting his injected packets' HTTP headers, Oscar can cache spoofed objects (for instance, webpages) for a long time. When using a Web cache, this can impact many users. 21 D efenses should be designed and analyzed carefully, not "patched" by reusing existing fields whose entropy might be insufficient or reduced by side channels. To prevent these and other attacks, even by stronger MITM attackers, we recommend deploying cryptographic defenses where computational and communication overheads are acceptable.
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